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FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR  
SENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A WORK IN PROGRESS 
DANIEL RICHMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, it seems odd for an American contributor to an international 
conference on sentencing to focus on “high end” federal white collar 
sentencing. After all, federal cases make up a relatively small part of the U.S. 
criminal justice system. (Between October 2005 and September 2006, about 
1,132,290 people were sentenced for a felony in state courts,1 and 73,009 in 
federal courts.)2 Even within the federal system, white collar cases of all sorts 
are a relatively small part of a criminal docket dominated by immigration, drug, 
and gun cases, which together comprised nearly 73% of all federal cases in 
2009.3 And the “crimes involving fraud, deceit, theft, embezzlement, insider 
trading, and other forms of deception” that accounted for 9.5% of 2009 cases 
includes a great many offenders and offenses of the middling sort.4 Moreover, 
what is meant by “high end” anyway? Does a vague directional reference allow 
one to sidestep the longstanding scholarly debate about defining “white collar 
crime?”5 
The provisional answer is “yes,” at least when broadly speaking of 
sentencing policy. One need not be either rigorous or comprehensive in 
defining the relevant class of cases to appreciate the outsized role that the 
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 1.  SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—
STATISTICAL TABLES (2009). 
 2.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 225711, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl5.1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf. 
 3.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, FISCAL YEAR 2009, 
at 1 (2010). 
 4.  Id. at 10.   
 5.  See generally Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
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sentences given to the well-off and well-placed play in perceptions about the 
fairness and efficacy of American criminal justice. Whether driven by public 
interest or schadenfreude, media coverage gives these cases of financial scandal 
and public corruption a profile disproportionate to their number. And the work 
of Tom Tyler and others6 suggests that this profile and the impressions it leaves 
will potentially play a critical role in the legitimization of enforcement efforts 
more generally. Indeed, while I make no rigorous argument of historical 
connection, it is worth noting that federal sentencing reform has coincided with 
an intensification in the federal commitment to pursue the grander white collar 
offenders—not simply bank embezzlers, con artists, and corrupt line actors in 
the public and private sector—and that both occurred during the same post-
Watergate period of destabilized governmental authority.7 In both projects, one 
sees strains of the “leveling down” that Jim Whitman has found characteristic of 
American punishment practices.8 
The story of how the federal system has dealt with high end white collar 
offenders is worth telling. After all, sentencing stories are one of the United 
States’ most valuable exports—generally ones that teach other countries what 
not to do. This one will show the convoluted path we have taken to come—at 
least with respect to doctrinal regulation—nearly full circle, the closest we’ve 
come to the 1980s in the last three decades. Given how much judicial, 
adversarial, and legislative energy has been spent to go what seems like such a 
short distance, a clear-eyed assessment of the project seems in order for 
Americans. Perhaps others can profit from our experience as well. 
After briefly sketching out this story, I hope to explore the lessons, with 
particular attention to the interaction between institutional and procedural 
structures and theoretical white collar sanctioning goals. The precise nature of 
these institutional and procedural structures is jurisdiction-specific, and my 
references will be exclusively U.S. federal.9 But I hope to highlight the need to 
consider such structures when considering how to sentence in cases that will 
regularly test the perceived commitment of any jurisdiction’s sentencing regime 
to both equity and equality. 
 
 6.  See generally Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 
ANN. REV. PSCYCHOL. 375 (2006).  
 7.  See Tony G. Poveda, White Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization 
of a Concept, 17 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (1992); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of 
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223 (1993). 
 8.  JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 42–43 (2003). 
 9.  Cases like Reeves v. Indiana, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a fifty-four-year 
sentence for a defendant convicted of a church-bond Ponzi scheme that resulted in a loss of $13,149,000 
lost by 2,904 victims, serve as a reminder that the issues discussed here are arising in state courts with 
increasing frequency. 953 N.E.2d 665, 672 (Ind. 2011). 
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II 
THE NEARLY CIRCULAR ROAD TAKEN 
Back in the 1970s, Kenneth Mann and his Yale colleagues—who presciently 
studied white collar sentencing just as the area started to attract prosecutorial 
attention—did a lovely job capturing how judges approached these cases in a 
regime of unbounded discretion: judges certainly considered general deterrence 
in all their sentences, but in white collar cases that single goal loomed largest.10 
And while the need to promote general deterrence often counseled the 
imposition of prison time, class considerations counseled restraint: “Most judges 
share a widespread belief that the suffering experienced by the white collar 
person as a result of apprehension, public indictment and conviction, and the 
collateral disabilities incident to conviction—loss of job, professional licenses, 
and status in the community—completely satisfies the need to punish the 
individual.”11 Indeed judges had a special empathy for defendants “whose 
position in society may be very much like their own.”12 
These judicial tendencies were of explicit concern to Congress when it 
passed the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. As the Senate Report explained: 
[It is our] view that in the past there have been many cases, particularly in instances of 
major white collar crime, in which probation has been granted because the offender 
required little or nothing in the way of institutionalized rehabilitative measures . . . and 
because society required no insulation from the offender, without due consideration 
being given to the fact that the heightened deterrent effect of incarceration and the 
readily perceivable receipt of just punishment accorded by incarceration were of 
critical importance. The placing on probation of [a white collar criminal] may be 
perfectly appropriate in cases in which, under all the circumstances, only the 
rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a sentence may be grossly 
inappropriate, however, in cases in which the circumstances mandate the sentence’s 
carrying substantial deterrent or punitive impact.
13
 
Once it set to work drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
Sentencing Commission—as Commissioner and then-Judge Stephen Breyer 
later explained—found that in white collar fraud cases 
courts granted probation to offenders more frequently than in situations involving 
analogous common law crimes; furthermore, prison terms were less severe for white 
collar criminals who did not receive probation. To mitigate the inequities of these 
discrepancies, the Commission decided to require short but certain terms of 
confinement for many white collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and 
antitrust offenders, who previously would have likely received only probation.
14
 
 
 10.  Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the White Collar Offender, 17 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482 (1980). See also United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (sentencing a nursing home operator, prominent sentencing reformer Judge Marvin Frankel 
noted, “[W]e continue to include among our working hypotheses a belief (with some concrete evidence 
in its support) that crimes like those in this case—deliberate, purposeful, continuing, non-impulsive, 
and committed for profit—are among those most likely to be generally deterrable by sanctions most 
shunned by those exposed to temptation.”).  
 11.  Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 10, at 483–84. 
 12.  Id. at 500. 
 13.  S. REP. No. 98–225, at 91–92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274–75. 
 14.  Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which 
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The Guidelines that emerged were primarily driven by the economic 
“loss” that judges were charged with calculating, a task that turned out to be 
enormously complex, challenging courts to devise methodologies for calculating 
“intended” or “actual” loss and, sometimes, gain.15 Before long, responding 
to complaints from the Justice Department, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, and many probation officers that “sentences for some mid- to 
high-level economic defendants remained too low in relation to the seriousness 
of their offenses,”16 the Sentencing Commission embarked on an extensive 
consultative project that culminated in the 2001 Economic Crime Package. The 
new regime was designed to slightly lower the sentences of some classes of low-
loss offenders—allowing judges to impose probation in comparatively less 
serious cases—while raising significantly the sentences of most mid- to high-loss 
offenders.17 
A dog that did not bark in the white collar area—neither back in the 1980s 
nor (for the most part) since—was statutory mandatory minimums. The point 
becomes clear only when one notices that, in 1984, without even waiting for the 
Commission to formulate and implement guidelines for narcotics and violent 
offenses, Congress established mandatory minimum sentences for a variety of 
drug and gun crimes, and has continued to do so every few years thereafter.18 
Perhaps Congress had more confidence in how judges would sentence white 
collar offenders. More likely, the issue simply lacked political salience at the 
time. 
The collapse of the Enron Corporation at the end of 2001—“barely a month 
after the new economic crime guidelines became effective”19—brought just this 
salience. While Congress did not reach for mandatory minimums, the 
mandatory status of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provided the necessary 
bite for the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, which ordered the Sentencing 
Commission to consider a variety of enhancements to the Guidelines.20 As a 
result of this legislative intervention, base offense levels were increased in most 
fraud prosecutions, and the loss table was yet again extended to increase the 
 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1988). 
 15.  See Daniel C. Richman, Calculation of Loss Under Fraud Guidelines, in 2 WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES 18 (Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo eds., 
1998); Frank O. Bowman, Coping with “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic 
Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998).  
 16.  Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing 
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines 
Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 388 (2004) [hereinafter Pour Encourager].  
 17.  Id. at 389. 
 18.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ch. 2 (1991). 
 19.  Pour Encourager, supra note 16, at 392. 
 20.  Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 1104(a), (b)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 808–09; see also Stephanos Bibas, White 
Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 726–27 (2005). 
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presumptive sentence for defendants to whom the largest losses could somehow 
be attributed.21 
The bite of the Guidelines increased over time, as Congress moved to limit 
judicial discretion legislatively. While the Justice Department’s political leaders 
similarly sought to tie the hands of line prosecutors, demanding that they hew 
to the available facts in their Guidelines calculations, the net result appears to 
have been an increase in prosecutorial bargaining leverage, and in sentencing 
severity.22 Jamie Olis soon become the poster child for the harshness of the 
Guideline regime for white collar cases. A tax lawyer at Dynergy convicted 
after trial for his role in a scheme to misrepresent the company’s cash flow, Olis 
(who had not directly profited from the illegal transactions) initially received a 
sentence of more than twenty-four years’ imprisonment because of a loss 
computation driven by the $105 million stock loss suffered by one shareholder, 
the University of California Retirement System.23 
The rigid Guidelines regime soon crumbled, however, thanks to the 
Supreme Court’s 2005 intervention in United States v. Booker,24 which held the 
mandatory application of the Guidelines unconstitutional and converted the 
scheme into an advisory regime. Sentencing judges were to consider Guidelines 
sentencing ranges, but only in the context of the more general goals set out in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—the general sentencing statute. While the Booker Court, 
invoking Blackstone, celebrated the role of juries as the “sacred bulwark of the 
nation,”25 district courts were the primary beneficiary of the decision. Yet they 
did not rush to claim the discretionary power that Booker re-allocated to them. 
The reasons for this reticence varied across circuits and within districts.26 
Appellate courts were often slow to grant sentencing judges the freedom 
envisioned by Booker. Prosecutors sought to prop up the Guidelines regime by 
hewing to it in their sentencing advocacy. And sentencing judges themselves 
may have come to appreciate the informational value and safety of the 
Guidelines. 
Still, the world indeed changed after Booker, particularly as the Supreme 
Court drove the message of sentencing judge discretion home in a series of 
 
 21.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, LOSS PRIMER (2011) (explaining how losses are calculated 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).  
 22. See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center 
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L. J. 1375, 1388–90 (2008); see also Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, 
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1472–77 (2008); Bibas, supra note 20, 
at 728–30.  
 23.  See Simon Romero, Revision of 24-Year Prison Term Ordered in Accounting Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/02/business/02dynegy.html?_ 
r=1  (noting how Olis had “become the poster child for excessive punishment for white collar crime”); 
see also United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d. 540, 548–49 (5th Cir. 2005) (describing misapplication of federal 
sentencing guidelines in case and remanding for re-sentencing). 
 24.  543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 25.  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (quoting BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 343–344 (1769)).  
 26.  See Richman, supra note 22, at 1411–18 (elaborating on post-Booker dynamics). 
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follow-up cases—with Pepper v. United States27 the most recent.28 The ebb and 
flow of white collar sentencing doctrine is highlighted in cases like United States 
v. Tomko,29 where a plumbing contractor pleaded guilty to tax evasion, 
admitting to having falsely made the invoices submitted for the construction of 
his home seem like a business expense. In 2005, having calculated Tomko’s 
(advisory) Guideline range to be between twelve and eighteen months, the 
district judge, citing Tomko’s “negligible criminal history, his record of 
employment, his support for and ties in the community, and the extensive 
charitable work he has done,” sentenced him to “three years of probation (the 
first of which would be served as home detention), participation in an alcohol 
treatment program, 250 hours of community service, full restitution, and the 
statutory maximum fine of $250,000.”30 The government appealed the sentence 
and a Third Circuit panel reversed, noting, 
We share with the Government concern about the message a sentence of probation 
for the indisputably serious offense of willful tax evasion sends to the public at large 
and would-be violators. Tomko’s sentence of probation included home confinement in 
the very mansion built through the fraudulent tax evasion scheme at issue in this 
case—an 8,000-square-foot house on approximately eight acres, with a home theater, 
an outdoor pool and sauna, a full bar, $1,843,500 in household furnishings, and $81,000 
in fine art. The perverse irony of this gilded cage confinement was not lost on the 
Government, it is not lost on us, and it would not be lost on any reasonable public 
observer of these proceedings, including those would-be offenders who may be 
contemplating the risks associated with willful tax evasion.
31
 
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court handed down Gall v. United States,32 
and admonished appellate courts not to apply a presumption of 
unreasonableness when a district court imposes a sentence outside the 
Guideline range. Rather, appellate courts were to “consider the extent of the 
deviation,”33 giving “due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 
3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the 
appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was 
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”34 The 
Supreme Court explained: 
The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import 
under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes 
credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not 
conveyed by the record. . . . The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity 
with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the 
Commission or the appeals court. . . . [Moreover,] [d]istrict courts have an institutional 
 
 27.  131 S Ct. 1229 (2011). 
 28.  See also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 
(2007); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curiam). 
 29.  562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 30.  Id. at 563–64. 
 31.  United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated and different results reached 
on rehearing, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 32.  552 U.S. 38 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
 33.  Id. at 47. 
 34.  Id. at 51. 
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advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as 
they see so many more Guidelines sentences than appellate courts do.
35
 
Not long thereafter, the Third Circuit took Tomko’s case en banc and 
reinstated his sentence. The Court noted that 
a significant number of us, if we were sitting as the district judge, might have applied 
the § 3553(a) factors differently had we been the sentencing court. But this 
disagreement does not, by itself, demand reversal. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also 
United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“That we may ourselves 
have imposed a sentence different from that of the district court, based on our own de 
novo assessment of the evidence, is no basis to overturn the judgment.”). We reverse 
only when we discern an abuse-of-discretion. Looking at the record before us, we fail 
to see one here.
36
 
Case-mix variation—particularly the constant increase in immigration 
cases—makes it hard to quantify the aggregate effect of the new discretionary 
regime on sentencing. As Frank Bowman has noted, 
[T]he marked decline in average federal sentence beginning in 2008 correlates directly 
with the recent explosion in relatively low-sentence immigration prosecutions . . . . FY 
2008 may have been the year in which judges reading Kimbrough and Gall first 
understood that they had a green light to vary from the guidelines at will, but probably 
more importantly it also marked the beginning of a huge upsurge in immigration 
cases, which went from 17,592 or 24.2% of all federal cases in 2007 to roughly 30,000 
or 35.2% of all cases in 2011. Given that the average sentence for an immigration case 
is 16.3 months, as compared to 70.2 months for drug trafficking, 82.7 months for 
firearms, and 22.7 months for fraud, the downward pressure exerted on the federal 
average sentence of this one change in case mix is immense.
37
 
There is some evidence that both inter-district and intra-district sentencing 
variations have increased.38 Yet the extent of such variation—which one would 
 
 35.  Id. at 51–52. 
 36.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574. For a similar case, see United States v. Trupin, 475 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 
2007), where the panel initially reversed a tax sentence as “unreasonable.” Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court and then the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Trupin’s sentence in the wake of Kimbrough 
and Gall. United States v. Trupin, 291 F. App’x 449 (2d Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Gardellini, 
545 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding probation for a tax conviction). But see United States v. 
Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing a probation and home detention sentence in tax evasion 
case, finding that district court had failed to consider the relevant policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission, which treat tax evasion as a serious crime, emphasize the importance of 
general deterrence, and reflect the view that under pre-Guidelines practice too many probationary 
sentences were imposed for tax crimes).  
 37.  Frank O. Bowman III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing 
System, 24 FED. SENT. RPTR. 5, 7 (2012). 
 38.  See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2010) (finding that, at least in the District of Massachusetts, inter-judge disparity has 
significantly increased since Booker); see also United States v. Whigham, 754 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Mass. 
2010) (Gertner, J.) (critiquing the Scott article); Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations Documented in 
Federal Sentencing, TRAC REPORTS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/274/ (a widely 
covered judge-by-judge review by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse for federal 
sentencing in 2007–2011 that found “extensive and hard-to-explain differences in the sentencing 
practices by the judges working in many federal districts”). But see Amy Baron-Evans, Jennifer Coffin 
& Paul J. Hofer, TRAC’s Report Claiming “Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variation” Fails to Compare 
Similar Cases, Relies on Poor Quality Data, Uses an Unreliable Method of Identifying Case Type, Uses 
Incorrect Methods of Reporting Sentence Length, and Contains Numerous Errors, SENTENCING 
RESOURCE COUNSEL PROJECT, FEDERAL PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY DEFENDERS, http://www.fd.org/ 
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certainly expect to occur with the reduction of the Guidelines to advisory status 
and the substantial relaxation of appellate review—is difficult to determine. 
Moreover, as Amy Baron-Evans and Kate Stith have explained, figuring out 
what variation is normatively troubling is even harder.39 
To what extent have sentencing judges made use of their new discretionary 
license in white collar cases? In October 2011, the Chair of the Sentencing 
Commission, Judge Patti Saris, reported: “In the Post-Gall Period the rate at 
which courts imposed a non-government sponsored below range sentence [in 
fraud cases] varied from a high of 46.8[%] in the district with the highest rate to 
a low of 1.4[%] in the district with the lowest rate, representing a range of 45.4 
percentage points.”40 Yet perhaps because finding a useful quantitative metric is 
difficult, or because stable patterns have yet to emerge, assessments of the new 
regime have largely been driven by anecdote and rhetoric. In a June 28, 2010 
letter to the chair of the Sentencing Commission, Jonathan Wroblewski, the 
official who represents the Justice Department on the Commission, focused on 
high-loss fraud cases as one area in which many judges were imposing sentences 
“inconsistently and without regard to the federal sentencing guidelines.”41 At a 
January 26, 2011 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on new fraud legislation, 
Republican Senator Charles Grassley observed: 
I would like to note that regardless of the substantive laws we pass, the investigative 
and law enforcement resources appropriated and the prosecutions brought so far, 
criminal fraud will not be [adequately] deterred unless we revisit the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Booker. . . . Now that the Guidelines have been held to be 
merely advisory, the disparity and unfairness in judicially imposed sentences that we 
sought to eliminate on a bipartisan basis are returning, especially in two areas: child 
pornography and fraud cases of the type we are discussing today. If potential 
fraudsters view the lenient sentences now being handed down as merely a cost of 
doing business, efforts to combat criminal fraud could be undermined.
42
 
In February 2011 testimony to the Sentencing Commission, Preet Bharara, 
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, observed: 
There is concern, based on the experience of some Districts, that more and more, 
particularly in the context of high-loss, large-scale fraud cases, there are not 
consistently tough and fair outcomes. We have observed—and the Commission’s data 
have confirmed—that district courts are relying less and less on the sentencing 
guidelines, which are now advisory. Some are voicing concern that the fraud 
guidelines counsel sentences that are inappropriate to the crime committed . . . Others 
have expressed frustration that the guidelines provide inadequate assistance in 
 
docs/latest-news/src-trac-report.pdf?sfvrsn=8. 
 39.  See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2012). 
 40.  Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commussion Six 
Years after U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Sumcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 59 (2011) (prepared testimony of Hon. Patti B. Saris, 
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n). 
 41.  Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Office of Pol’y & Leg., Crim. Div., U.S. Dept’t of Justice, 
to the Hon. William K. Sessions III (June 28, 2010), available at 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 282, 285.  
 42.  Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing Challenges in the 
Fight Against Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of 
Sen. Charles Grassley).  
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developing intelligent and consistent sentencing decisions in certain white collar 
cases.
43
 
Calls from both the Administration and legislators for reining in judicial 
discretion have continued into 2012. In October 2011, a House Judiciary 
Committee Hearing titled “Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing 
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years after U.S. v. Booker,” led off 
with the subcommittee chair, Representative James Sensenbrenner, 
condemning post-Booker “sentencing disparities” and the “increasing 
frequency of downward departures” that favored fraud defendants among 
others.44 In November 2011, the head of the Justice Department’s Criminal 
Division complained that “[w]ith increasing frequency, federal judges have 
been sentencing fraud offenders—especially offenders involved in high-loss 
fraud cases—inconsistently.”45 And these departmental complaints have 
continued into 2012.46 
Yet others have either tentatively or wholeheartedly embraced the new 
discretionary regime. After sentencing the defendant in a faith-based hedge-
fund fraud to sixty months imprisonment, instead of the 210–262 months 
suggested by the Guidelines, Judge John Gleeson—a respected Brooklyn judge 
and part-time academic—took issue with the Departmental complaints raised in 
Wroblewski’s letter: 
I don’t know why the Department has chosen to complain about fraud sentences to 
the Commission but not to the circuit courts of appeals. It has no reason to believe 
such appeals would be futile—in the handful of cases in which the government has 
challenged sentences based on the sentencing judges’ application of the § 3553(a) 
factors, it has prevailed two-thirds of the time. Perhaps, as in this case, the prosecutors 
who are actually handling the cases in the courtrooms do not regard the sentences as 
unacceptable simply because they are below the advisory Guidelines ranges. In any 
event, if the problem the DOJ Letter identifies in this area of federal sentencing in 
fact exists, there is no need for reform, as the solution is already available.
47
 
Our story thus ends without resolution or promise of stability. That federal 
white collar sentences have become more severe since the 1980s is clear.48 
Equally clear is our failure to devise an institutional framework for them that is 
 
 43.  Statement of Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y., Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 3–4 (Feb. 16, 2011). 
 44.  See Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six 
Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011).   
 45.  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Address at the American Lawyer National Law 
Journal Summit (Nov. 15, 2011).  
 46.  See Statement of Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options After Booker: Current State of Federal Sentencing, 
19–21 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
 47.  United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 
2010). 
 48.  See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279 (2007); 
Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White Collar Defendants and White Collar Crimes, 116 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007) (responding to Podgor’s claims as to sentencing patterns in the last two 
decades). 
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both appropriately nuanced and fair and that also reflects reasonable 
enforcement priorities.49 This seems like a good time to return to first principles, 
perhaps ones with transnational application. I make no claim to comprehensive 
coverage. Someone who, for instance, believes that the government should play 
a minimal role in policing the financial markets will get an argument from me in 
person but not here. Nor will I take on finer line-drawing projects, like figuring 
out what should count as criminally corrupt.50 Rather I take the substantive 
prohibitions of federal criminal law for granted—fully aware that a high degree 
of discretionary enforcement was intended—and explore how we might 
structure the current interaction of political and legal actors so as to serve the 
basic goals of deterring white collar crime and promoting some level of 
retributive justice. 
III 
THE TENSION BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND  
POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.   How Should Deterrence Considerations Affect the White Collar 
Sentencing Calculus? 
Deterrence considerations certainly loom large in discussions of white collar 
sentencing, albeit often with limited rigor. The intuition—and intuition it 
remains, for lack of clear empirical evidence, particularly with respect to crimes 
committed in the corporate setting—is that word of sanctions gets out pretty 
quickly to the relevant community and affects behavior. Sometimes, the 
government makes affirmative efforts. For example, the chief criminal tax 
enforcement official recently spoke of “marketing Justice Department 
convictions and sentencing to the tax preparation community,”51 and 
prosecutorial indictment and conviction press conferences will regularly speak 
of “sending a message.” But the general assumption seems to be that not much 
officially sponsored advertising is needed. Certainly, the government has not 
found the need to gather executives in a room to hear about the precise 
sentences received by their peers—an approach successfully used for targeting 
gun crime.52 
 
 49.  Statement of Professor Samuel W. Buell, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Public Hearing on Proposed Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 12 (March 14, 
2012) (noting that “[w]hite collar sentencing is tougher, and more predictably tough, than it was before 
the Sentencing Reform Act. But there is increasing evidence of large gyrations in federal white collar 
sentences that, given the lengthy terms of imprisonment at stake, are perhaps more costly than the 
variations that gave rise to federal sentencing reform in the first instance.”). 
 50.  See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815 
(2011). 
 51.  Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, 49 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 15, 17 (July 2001). 
 52.  See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: 
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 223 (2007). 
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Assumptions that sanctions deter do not necessarily yield a particular 
sentence or even a sentencing range. When, in the course of sentencing an 
executive convicted of accounting fraud, a New York federal judge noted, “the 
Government at no time here presented any evidence or cited to any studies 
indicating that a sentence of more than three-and-a-half years was necessary to 
achieve the retributive and general deterrence objectives applicable to a case 
like this one,” he was surely aware of the paucity of evidence pointing any 
particular direction.53 To impose a rigorous burden of proof in this area is (for 
better or worse) to predetermine the result. 
In the absence of data, the argument is frequently made that “even 
relatively short sentences can have a strong deterrent effect on prospective 
‘white collar’ offenders.”54 To this is often added the point, made long ago by 
Beccaria and sharpened more recently by Becker and others, that increasing the 
frequency of enforcement would lead to more deterrence than increasing the 
severity of sentences for those actually prosecuted.55 Out of these premises 
comes a cogent argument for a regime of frequent enforcement with relatively 
short prison sentences, which (at least to me) seems intuitively right. A more 
complete model would have to consider whether white collar offenders have 
idiosyncratic subjective expectations of the likelihood of enforcement. It may 
be, for instance, that “those most likely to have access to white collar crime 
opportunities” may be particularly prone to believe there is “little chance of 
getting caught and receiving a severe penalty.”56 For now, however, let us 
declare the model complete. 
Yet even if, through a combination of theory, intuition, and maybe a little 
data, a high frequency and low severity regime emerges as the winner in our 
deterrence laboratory, we are far from finished, at least in a world in which that 
regime’s fundamental premise of frequency is effectively unattainable—that is, 
the world we live in. For once one turns from deterrence theory to the domain 
of political economy, it becomes clear that—at least under all realistic 
scenarios—white collar prosecutions will always be pretty rare. Can I prove 
this? Not at all. A rigorous demonstration that such prosecutions are rare (or 
 
 53.  United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 301 F.App’x 93 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 54.  Id. at 514 (citing Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005); 
Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 492 (1998). Cf. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 56 (2004) (noting that the 
Sentencing Guidelines were written, in part, to “ensure a short but definite period of confinement for a 
larger proportion of these ‘white collar’ cases, both to ensure proportionate punishment and to achieve 
deterrence”). 
 55.  See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS, 
(Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies et al. trans., 1995) (1767); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000); Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 56.  Andrea Schoepfer, Stephanie Carmichael & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Do Perceptions of 
Punishment Vary Between White Collar and Street Crimes?, 35 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 151, 160 (2007); see 
also Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1310–12 
(2008) (discussing interaction between deterrence and legal uncertainty in white collar area). 
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frequent) requires data on the rate of white collar offending—how much fraud 
or corruption has occurred in any particular period. To be sure, thanks to tax 
authorities’ audit capabilities, we have some interesting data with respect to tax 
evasion;57 market surveillance gives us a sense of insider trading rates; and 
reporter polling sheds light on the prevalence of local political corruption.58 But 
the focus on criminal intent that dominates most inquiries into white collar 
crime has always posed an insurmountable challenge to aggregate data 
collection and base-rate determination.59 Suffice it to say that intelligent and 
adequately funded enforcers have never wanted for instances of financial fraud 
or political corruption to pursue.60 
The same detection issues that stymie data collectors are also a dominating 
feature of white collar enforcement dynamics that, whatever the base offending 
rate, ensure that white collar prosecutions will comprise only a small—albeit 
much talked about—part of the criminal docket. This is a world where reporting 
“victims” have often not suffered their losses as a result of criminal conduct, 
and where real “victims” of crimes are often unaware. It is also a world where, 
absent some conspicuous scandal or perceived crisis, the political pressure on 
enforcement agencies to pursue these cases is limited, and the demand for 
“restraint” or “moderation” in the service of capital formation or local norms is 
great. And it is one in which the opportunity costs with respect to other criminal 
priorities—whether violent crime, drugs or immigration—almost always seem 
more salient.61 
Even in the face of the political economy challenges, one could imagine a 
variety of institutional design features that would ensure that zealous and well-
funded prosecutors and enforcement agencies regularly pursued serious cases of 
financial fraud, health care fraud, and political corruption regardless of the 
political climate or public clamor.62 One could even imagine civil regulators 
closely coordinating with the criminal enforcers, contributing their institutional 
 
 57.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., I.R.S., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON 
IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2007).  
 58.  The State Accountability Project is currently (as of February 2011) drawing on a network of 
political reporters to survey and rank all fifty states with respect to corruption. See Steve Behrens, What 
Do Statehouses, City Halls Do About Corruption?, CURRENT.ORG (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.current.org/wp-content/themes/current/archive-site/news/news1104statecorruption.html.  
 59.  See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1627 (2007) 
(noting that “the more sophisticated the fraud, the more difficult it is to identify as fraud (which is, in 
essence, the wrong of taking or attempting to take another’s property by deceptive means structured so 
as not to fall within the basic prohibition against theft).”); see also PWC, CYBERCRIME: PROTECTING 
AGAINST THE GROWING THREAT, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY 16–27 (2011) (providing a 
recent global survey on the incidence of fraud). 
 60.  See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from 
U.S. States (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/ 
LPE.Alt.pdf (finding that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other 
things equal).  
 61.  See Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2108–14 (2009). 
 62.  See id. at 2016–19. 
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competence to prosecutorial efforts and picking up those cases meriting less 
punitive treatment.63 Some may even believe we live in such a world, and that, 
were we to reduce white collar sentences, we could seamlessly increase 
enforcement frequency to make up the difference on the deterrence curve. For 
my part, I do not see anything close to that happening now or in the foreseeable 
future. And if my deep skepticism about the possibility of a stable commitment 
to white collar enforcement is warranted, we should not expect that increased 
certainty will accompany decreased severity. 
Rest assured that I make no claim that current white collar sentences are at 
some normatively “right” level. Indeed, a consequence of the dysfunctional 
political economy of white collar enforcement is that when Congress does 
decide to “go after” white collar crime, generally in the wake of some well-
publicized scandal, it does so by hiking sentences without doing much in the 
way of ensuring that the resources hurried to the area will stay there. This is the 
story of the Sarbanes-Oxley sentencing provisions and, as Carol Steiker has 
written,64 of other sentencing debacles as well. It may also be the story behind 
the Justice Department’s dogged advocacy (against all odds, in a number of 
district courts) for adherence to highly punitive guidelines. To the extent that 
macro political dynamics drive sentencing levels (as opposed to judicial 
discretion or the decisions of an insulated commission), there can be only one 
direction for sentencing: up, at an unreasonably steep gradient.  The point for 
now is simply that, given political realities, the deterrence curve offers but 
limited support for lower sentences. 
IV 
SENTENCING ACTORS OR POTENTIAL ACTORS 
If the foregoing political and enforcement realities make it so difficult to 
appropriately incorporate deterrence considerations into white collar 
sentencing, how can one devise an optimal sentencing regime, which would 
presumably consider not just deterrence but other traditional sentencing goals 
like desert, individualized treatment, and proportionality?65 The short answer is 
that I have no idea. The longer answer is that in this second—or third—best 
world, we can start by identifying the contributions and pathologies of a 
regime’s actual or potential parts—Congress, prosecutorial hierarchs committed 
to wholesale management, and the plea bargaining system that resolves most 
 
 63.  See Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options, in THE POLITICAL 
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ (Michael Klarman et 
al. eds., 2011). 
 64.  See Carol S. Steiker, Lessons From Two Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child 
Pornography Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 27. 
 65.  For a bracing exploration of current theories of punishment and their all-too-frequent failure 
to engage the problem of mass incarceration, see Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of 
Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203 (2012).  
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cases at the retail level—and try to balance one troubling tendency against 
another. 
Let us start with Congress, whose tendency to hike sentences when it is 
outraged, and not to lower them after the outrage subsides, has already been 
noted. When these responses take the form of legislative “noise”—like 
increases in statutory maximums that do not affect actual sentences66—we ought 
not be too quick to condemn. To be sure, such measures are often just a species 
of campaign literature. Yet given that every legislative enactment has some 
political opportunity cost, perhaps we ought to embrace these as useful signals 
to prosecutors and even judges of political priorities and commitments. 
Particularly once we move away from a formal deterrence model and consider a 
messy world in which general jurisdiction prosecutors have to allocate scarce 
enforcement resources and in which years of imprisonment are supposed to, at 
least in part, convey societal condemnation, weak signals of this sort can help 
align the preferences of insulated decision makers with those of the larger 
community. 
What about strong legislative signals that take the form of mandated 
guidelines or mandatory minimums? Here we need to weigh the value of 
democratic accountability against the pathologies of wholesale legislative 
sentencing (of which we have considerable evidence). As Carol Steiker 
explains,67 the U.S. federal experience has been not only that legislatively set 
sentences are carelessly chosen to begin with but that, once set, such 
benchmarks will thereafter provide easy access points for further intervention. 
Such intervention will always ratchet upward, as legislators will rest secure in 
the often unrealistic expectation that prosecutorial discretion will prevent 
conspicuous injustices. Or at least that Congress will not take political heat for 
such injustices. 
It has been argued, and perhaps we will soon see, that the vast expenditures 
required by a high incarceration regime can restrain legislators’ punitive 
tendencies.68 No such restraining effort ought to be expected in the white collar 
area, however, given the relatively small numbers involved and the extent of 
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, against the costs of incarceration, a fiscally 
focused legislator will consider the adjudicative and investigative savings that 
will flow from the coupling of a harsh mandatory sentencing regime with a plea 
bargaining system. In a system in which legislative provisions ostensibly 
threatening sentencing outcomes are really just an “assignment of bargaining 
resources to the executive authorities,”69 even the legislator not caught up in 
 
 66.  See, e.g., The White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 
Stat. 804 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, & 29 U.S.C.).  
 67.  See Steiker, supra note 64, at 49–50.  
 68.  See generally PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS (2009); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE CONTINUING FISCAL CRISIS IN 
CORRECTIONS: SETTING A NEW COURSE (2010). 
 69.  DONALD A. DRIPPS, The Substance–Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 409, 415 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
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symbolic politics will be tempted to “print” freely the sentencing leverage that 
prosecutors will use to “buy” information and guilty pleas from defendants. The 
expense of pursuing white collar investigations and prosecutions against well-
resourced defendants makes this temptation particularly great. All of these 
factors strongly counsel against resort to statutory mandatory minimums or 
indeed to any unmediated legislative intervention. 
Prosecutors, of course, will have similar reason to seek plea-bargaining 
leverage, at least as an institutional matter. Indeed, the Justice Department’s 
forbearance in seeking mandatory minimums in financial fraud cases is 
remarkable for this reason.70 Perhaps the Department’s June 2010 letter to the 
Sentencing Commission was intended to signal a readiness to reassess this 
forbearance in light of the sentencing leniency permitted by Booker. Yet Judge 
Gleeson’s opinion in United States v. Ovid—responding to the Department’s 
complaints about low white collar sentences by noting prosecutorial 
participation in them—reminds us that prosecutorial interests are not 
monolithic, and that the negotiation positions that line prosecutors take (which 
may actually reflect the exercise of this leverage) can undercut the 
Department’s efforts to advocate at the wholesale level.71 While the Bush 
Justice Department made a concerted effort, via the “Ashcroft Memorandum” 
and other measures, to prevent line prosecutors from reducing ostensibly rigid 
and severe sentencing provisions to bargaining chits,72 its lack of success and the 
inherent challenges of hierarchical supervision of the adjudicative process make 
it inevitable that any mandatory system will be mediated by, and needs to be 
viewed through the prism of, line-actor negotiations. 
The inevitable intermediation of plea bargains poses a challenge not just to 
the project of top-down legislative control but to the legitimacy of the 
sentencing numbers that the project specifies. When severe ranges are set with 
an eye to their reduction via bargaining—for cooperation or a mere guilty 
plea—the sentences of defendants with the least to offer can end up 
outrageously high. This was the story—initially at least—of Jamie Olis. Yet if 
they are not, prosecutors’ ability to extract guilty pleas and information from 
defendants may be reduced. The justice of a regime that treats punishments so 
instrumentally is of course contestable. What cannot be contested, however, are 
the unique enforcement opportunities that such a regime creates in the United 
States and that no other system has (in my opinion) duplicated. There is a cold 
brutality and inherent risk of unreliability in the way we use the threat of vastly 
 
The path-breaking work on this point was done by Bill Stuntz. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of 
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006). 
 70.  See John Esterhay, “Street Justice” for Corporate Fraud—Mandatory Minimums for White 
Collar Crime, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 135 (2009) (arguing for the deployment of mandatory minimums 
in the area). 
 71.  See United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390, at *4–6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 1, 2010).  
 72.  See Richman, supra note 22, at 1388–90; see also Stith, supra note 22, at 1469–70.  
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greater prison time to squeeze information out of culpable defendants. But no 
equally effective tool for prying closely held information about corrupt dealings 
or other, less genteel forms of organized crime, has been devised.73 Although, in 
the white collar area, the clientele probably would be ready to cooperate even 
without the kind of massive sentencing exposures they face today, some degree 
of prosecutorial leverage (of the sort recognized everywhere except criminal 
procedure doctrine as “coercion”) is needed. 
Another source of the prosecutorial interest in rigidity takes us right back to 
Kenneth Mann’s work in the 1980s and the perspectives of sentencing judges. 
To be sure, judicial attitudes towards white collar crime have doubtless changed 
considerably since then. I suspect, for instance, that the new crop of judges is far 
more likely to treat fraud and corruption as “real” crime than those on the 
bench in the 1970s. It may also be that egalitarian sensitivities drive judges more 
now than before to use the sentences given to violent or “blue collar” offenses 
as reference points in white collar cases.74 Still, there is some, but far from 
conclusive, evidence that some of the troubling factors influencing sentencing in 
the 1970s remain active today. I am especially struck by the sentencing statistics 
in tax cases: of the 660 tax offense sentencings in fiscal year 2010, almost half 
were “non-government sponsored below range.”75 My focus on these is 
contestable, since tax enforcement is a politically fraught subject and so few tax 
cases are brought that any prosecution may seem arbitrary. But in other 
respects they seem like the quintessential white collar cases: no identifiable 
victim, a defendant who can purport to be otherwise upstanding (particularly 
 
 73.  See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 69 (1995); Daniel C. Richman, 
Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 292 (1996); see also JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS: HOW FALSE STATEMENTS 
ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA: FROM MARTHA STEWART TO BERNIR MADOFF 3–120 (2011) 
(providing a painstaking account of the process by which a trading assistant came to cooperate against 
Martha Stewart). 
 74.  United States v. Vanderbrake, 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 1005–06 (N.D. Iowa 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 
1030 (8th Cir. 2012). In Vanderbrake, Judge Mark Bennett—a regular source of thoughtful sentencing 
opinions—explained why he had given a price-fixing defendant an above-Guidelines sentence. He 
noted, 
What the court finds most disquieting about Vandebrake’s history and characteristics is that 
Vandebrake was already wealthy when he embarked on and engaged in the charged 
conspiracies. Vandebrake can make no claim to be a latter-day Jean Valjean, the unemployed 
protagonist in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables who was imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread 
to feed his widowed sister's seven children. . . . Equally troubling is the fact that Vandebrake is 
one of the few white collar defendants I have sentenced where the sentencing record is totally 
devoid of any community work, participation in any service organizations, or charitable giving. 
There is no record evidence of even a single good deed done by Vandebrake for anyone other 
than his family. Vandebrake makes a mockery of the adage that "to whom much is given, 
much is expected. 
Id. 
 75.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.27A, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/ 
2010/SBTOC10.htm (Of 660 tax sentences in fiscal year 2010, 279 (42.3%) are non-government-
sponsored below range. Child pornography is the only close one, with 42.7% of sentences non-
government below range.). 
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now that the IRS has endeavored to bring fewer “Al Capone” style pretextual 
prosecutions and more tax-gap cases),76 and diffuse benefits that do not flow to 
any particular district.77 An even starker pattern emerges from criminal antitrust 
cases, where below-Guidelines sentences have become the norm since Booker.78 
Recent complaints from the Justice Department and legislators about leniency 
toward the well-heeled are probably overstated. But there is not nothing to 
them. 
V 
THE PROMISE OF ADVISORY GUIDELINES 
Reasonably soft sentencing guidelines—of the sort envisioned by the 
Supreme Court’s latest opinions—seem to offer the promise of a happy middle: 
loose strictures that force judges to think hard about categorical deterrence and 
retributive determinations, but that leave decent space for well-reasoned retail 
sentence tailoring. Yet finding the appropriate metrics has been, and may 
inevitably be, a challenge, particularly when one moves away from “off the 
rack” cases such as internet or credit card frauds.79 
Consider the recent options-backdating prosecutions. Does one look to the 
stock drop when the fraud was discovered? The loss to the firm, if there is one? 
The gain to the backdating executive?80 In 2010, after initially getting a twenty-
one-month sentence, winning on appeal, and getting convicted again, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Brocade Communications Systems was sentenced 
to eighteen months in prison.81 That same year, in another options-backdating 
case, the prosecutor sought a six-and-a-half-year sentence for a CEO and noted, 
“‘To promote respect for the law, the public must be assured that a wealthy, 
well-connected individual, regardless of his station, array of prominent friends 
and associates, history of private success or acts of public largesse, will be 
subject to the same standard of criminal justice as those less fortunate.’”82 
 
 76.  For data on legal versus illegal source tax evasion cases brought in the last decade, see 
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REP 2010–30–074, TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION DIVISION’S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES SHOWED IMPROVEMENTS; HOWEVER, SOME 
GOALS WERE NOT ATTAINED (2010).  
 77.  Richman, supra note 22, at 1410–11.  
 78.  See United States v. Vandebrake, 679 F.3d 2030 (8th Cir. 2012) (collecting data for 2005–11).  
 79.  These cases probably comprise a larger part of the federal docket than most realize. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 16 (2010). 
In 2009, for example, the losses in federal cases “involving fraud, deceit, theft, embezzlement, insider 
trading, and other forms of deception . . . ranged from less than $100 to more than $400 million,” but 
“[m]ore than half . . . involved a loss of less than $70,000.” Id. See also United States v. Manatau, 647 
F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011) (demonstrating that a relatively straightforward identity-theft case can easily 
involve $30,000 of intended loss, and perhaps even $70,000, depending on “intent” findings). 
 80.  See Pamela A. MacLean, Lawyers “Fly Blind” on Options Penalties: Debate Over How to 
Calculate Losses and White Sentencing Guidelines Should Apply, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 20, 2007, at 1.  
 81.  See Bob Egelko, 18 Months for Ex-Brocade CEO; Securities Backdating, S.F. CHRON., June 25, 
2010, at D6.  
 82.  Edvard Pettersson & Tori Richards, Karatz Gets Five Years Probation in KB Home 
Backdating Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 11, 2010. 
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District Judge Otis D. Wright II called the prosecution remarks “mean-spirited 
and beneath this office,” and sentenced the defendant to eight months of home 
detention, a $1 million fine, and 2,000 hours of community service.83 Whether 
the Sentencing Commission’s 2012 effort to address this particular loss 
calculation problem84 will be successful remains to be seen. 
The problem with using loss (or gain) as a sentencing metric is not simply 
that arriving at such amounts can be difficult but that the time and effort spent 
at arriving at them will cast a shadow over the entire sentencing process, at the 
expense of other factors, even those whose consideration is legally required. 
One can only speculate on this anchoring bias. Perhaps it will be counteracted 
(depending on the procedural framework and appellate case law) by a 
sentencing judge’s embrace of qualitative factors in which she enjoys a special 
competence. Either way, there is a substantial likelihood that a preliminary 
quantifiable task will distort the larger qualitative project in which it is 
embedded.85 
Back in 2004, Judge Gerard Lynch (a Columbia colleague) critiqued the 
inadequate guidance that the loss-driven Guidelines provided for his sentencing 
of a securities trading assistant who defrauded his firm by making unauthorized 
trades for his own accounts. Specifically, he noted, 
All else being equal, large thefts damage society more than small ones, create a 
greater temptation for potential offenders, and thus generally require greater 
deterrence and more serious punishment. But the guidelines provisions for theft and 
fraud place excessive weight on this single factor, attempting—no doubt in an effort to 
fit the infinite variations on the theme of greed into a limited set of narrow sentencing 
boxes—to assign precise weights to the theft of different dollar amounts. In many 
cases, including this one, the amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral 
seriousness of the offense or the need for deterrence. To a considerable extent, the 
amount of loss caused by this crime is a kind of accident, dependent as much on the 
diligence of the victim’s security procedures as on Emmenegger’s cupidity. Had 
Emmenegger been caught sooner, he would have stolen less money; had he not been 
caught until later, he would surely have stolen more. Nothing about the offense 
indicates that Emmenegger set out to steal $300,000, no more and no less. Rather, he 
took advantage of his position to steal various amounts from time to time.
86
 
Yet once one moves away from formulaic metrics like “amount of loss,” 
assessments of culpability are slippery.87 The lack of a clear metric for severity 
will not always redound to a defendant’s favor. The involvement of identifiable 
and grievously injured victims in the sentencing process may well have a 
significant effect.88 But victims will not always be so identifiable or sympathetic. 
 
 83.  Id. (noting that Karatz’s acquittal on significant counts may have substantially affected the 
sentencing calculus). 
 84.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1–2 (2012). 
 85.  Note that similar (but not identical) problems occur with the focus on drug quantity in the 
narcotics sentencing regime. 
 86.  United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 87.  See David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, “Losing Ground”—In Search of a Remedy for the 
Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud and Theft, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141 (2011) for a thoughtful analysis and suggestions. 
 88.  Although obviously an extreme case, the Madoff sentencing powerfully illustrates this. See 
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And a court’s inability to adopt some pre-specified measure to fit a crime can 
heighten the salience of a defendant’s personal background (such as his deep 
roots in the community or acts of charity), with the letters from well-wishers far 
outnumbering those from victims. 
Furthermore, that the defendant’s conduct likely could have been pursued 
as a regulatory matter of civil enforcement and that similarly situated 
individuals will surely have escaped criminal prosecution will also complicate 
culpability assessments. Not only will a defendant be able to plausibly suggest 
that (notwithstanding the technical violation of the relevant criminal statutes) 
this is “really” a civil case, but he can also equally note that the regulatory 
punishment will be sufficient. Moreover, while one hopes that the government 
will have had good reason to select the defendant for prosecution, explaining 
the selection basis on the record may be difficult.89 The absence of a rigorously 
demarked divide between the civil and the criminal sides of federal white collar 
enforcement, however bewailed,90 is thus bound to exert a gravitation pull 
downward on sentences. 
One can easily imagine a thoughtful judge arriving at an appropriate “all 
things considered” sentence in a world of non-binding or vaguely framed 
guidelines. The challenge, however, is whether there can be any consistency 
across judges and more than a pretense at intellectual rigor across cases. 
The obvious solution to this problem would rely on the traditional common 
law method, and look to iteration and deferential appellate review to shape 
legal development. That current appellate opinions are rife with evidence or at 
least allegations of inconsistency and inadequacy91 may simply be the product of 
the advisory regime’s novelty, the disproportionately small number of white 
collar sentences (particularly the contested ones that follow a trial), and the 
failure of the Justice Department to fully engage in collaborative norm 
 
Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011. For more 
on the issues raised by increased victim participation, see Michael O’Hear, Punishment, Democracy, 
and Victims, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2006); Julie Kaster, The Voices of Victims: Debating the 
Appropriate Role of Fraud Victim Allocution Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1682 (2010). 
 89. See Ilene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White Collar Criminals in Federal 
Court: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1441 (1982). Nagel and Hagan 
note that  
a substantial likelihood of selection bias characterizes studies of the sentencing of white collar 
offenders. For one thing, the fact that administrative proceedings and civil remedies exist as 
viable alternatives to criminal prosecution may mean that the less egregious offenses and the 
higher status offenders may never face criminal charges. If so, those cases in the criminal court 
files represent a biased sample of offenses and offenders. The possibility that the existence of 
corporate codefendants may lead to greater administrative and judicial sympathy for 
individual white collar defendants introduces yet another possible source of selection bias. 
Id. 
 90.  See Richman, supra note 63. 
 91.  See, e.g., United States v. Vandebrake, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (Beam, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Edwards, 622 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gould, J., dissenting from denial of en 
banc review) (noting that “[t]his case is just the latest example of our circuit’s pattern of approving 
unreasonably lenient sentences for serious white collar offenses”).  
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articulation. Perhaps we are simply in an unsatisfying transition period that will 
end once prosecutors—in those relatively few, but very important, cases in 
which they are not aligned with defendants trying to sell a plea deal to judges—
have useful things to say that go beyond the loss-driven conversational rules of 
the Guidelines. Such nuanced conversations have surely started to occur, but 
they cannot be managed or structured from afar. A decision to acquiesce in or 
even encourage them would therefore require a formal allocation of authority 
to line actors, and away from Washington. We should embrace this diminution 
of perceived “national uniformity,” as such “uniformity” has always been 
illusionary, particularly in non-fungible white collar cases. 
The relative infrequency with which non-fungible white collar cases are 
brought will always limit our ability to develop stable, transparent, and fair 
sentencing doctrine. So will the populist outrage that often attends—or 
sparks—bursts of white collar enforcement. The media lead-up to the recent 
sentencing of Raj Rajaratnam, convicted after a much publicized insider-trading 
trial, drives the point home. Would he get the 19.5 to 24 years sought by the 
government or the six years suggested by defense counsel?92 What would the 
“message” be about the seriousness with which his crimes would be taken and 
those of like offenders pursued? So long as our political leadership is incapable 
of sustained support for white collar enforcement, the main communicative tool 
available to enforcers to show how “seriously” we take insider trading is a  
“serious” sentence. In a federal system of sentencing inflation, where going 
rates are set by the crimes that are regularly prosecuted, six years is not much, 
and ten years just does not seem that high.93 And so we back our way into a 
world where anything less than ten or more years gets taken as a signal of 
toleration. (Rajaratnam ultimately was sentenced to eleven years, a $10 million 
fine, and the forfeiture of $53.8 million by a judge who noted the defendant’s 
good deeds and health issues.)94 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Devising sentences for well-heeled defendants who have made undeniable 
contributions to society even as they have abused the positions of trust and 
power they have occupied would be a challenge, even if one put aside issues of 
power allocation and political economy. Yet one cannot put aside such issues, 
 
 92.  See Kara Scannell, Rajaratnam Sentence To Set New Standard, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011.  
 93.  In fiscal year 2011, the mean federal sentence figure of forty-three months (the median was 
twenty-one) was heavily affected by immigration defendants (more than a third of the total) who 
received a mean sentence of sixteen months (median of ten). Going in decreasing numbers of 
defendants: the median for drug trafficking defendants was seventy months (median of fifty-one); for 
fraud defendants, twenty-three months (median of twelve); for firearms defendants, eighty-three 
months (median of fifty-seven), and child pornography, 119 months (median of eighty-four). U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 31 (2012).  
 94.  Peter Lattman, 11 Years in Jail for Fund Chief in Stock Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at 
A1. 
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particularly in a system in which punitive white collar criminal enforcement 
takes an outsized role in governmental responses to political and economic 
corruption and in which white collar sentences are imposed in the context of a 
larger sentencing regime that is primarily devised for those who have had fewer 
advantages and far fainter political voices. Having returned to a world of 
considerable judicial discretion, all sentencing actors would do well to attend to 
all these challenges. This is likely to be a long (and, one hopes, uninterrupted) 
haul. 
 
